Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/04/28 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001101480011-2

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OLL		X		
14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS				
16	VC/NIC				
17	C/ACIS		X		
18	D/SOVA		X		
19	NIO/SP		X		
20	NIO/USSR		X		
21	ER				
22					
	SUSPENSE				

Date

Remarks

STAT

Executive Secretary

7 NOV 85

Date

3637 (10-81)

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/04/28 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001101480011-2

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/04/28 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001101480011-2

STEVE SYMMS
IDAHO

Executive Registry
85-2539/3

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

November 4, 1985

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President;

Enclosed for your information is an important speech my distinguished senior colleague Jim McClure gave on the Senate Floor last Friday, defending your Strategic Defense Initiative and your "fully justifiable" interpretation of the SALT I ABM Treaty to allow full SDI development and testing.

Mr. President, Senator McClure has provided new evidence that the Soviets admit their Surface to Air Missiles and Radars are being used as Anti-Ballistic Missiles, in direct violation of the SALT I ABM Treaty. I have been calling attention to this violation for two years. I note that this new Soviet admission was recently confirmed by another Soviet official. I therefore request that in light of confirmed Soviet admissions that their SAMs are dual capable ABMs, you review your judgements about Soviet ABM Treaty violations in two areas.

First, Soviet concurrent testing of ABM and SAM components should be upgraded from "highly probable violations" to unqualified "violations." Second, Soviet ABM and ABM-related actions in preparation for defense of the national territory of the U.S.S.R. should be upgraded from a "potential violation and serious cause for concern" to a clearcut "violation."

I request that this review be reported in your November 15 Response to Soviet (SALT) Violations Paper, and made public as soon as possible before the Summit. Secretary of Defense Weinberger assured Senator Helms in a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on October 31, 1985 that the Defense Department would answer the Helms-Symms-McCLure letter of October 29, 1983 before the Summit. (Letter attached.) It would thus appear that you are going to Geneva when the Soviets are engaged in 2 new Soviet SALT II violations, 2 new SALT I Interim Agreement violations, and 2 new SALT I ABM Treaty violations.

Respectfully,

Steve Symms

STEVE SYMMS
United States Senator

Attachments:

1.) Senator McClure's speech, November 1, 1985, "Preserving Deterrence Through U.S. Strategic Strength."
2.) Senators Helms, Symms and McClure Letter of October 29, 1985.

Copies To:

Secretary of Defense
Secretary of State
Director, CIA
Chairman, JCS
Director, ACDA

DCI EXEC REG

C-134

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/04/28 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001101480011-2

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/04/28 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001101480011-2

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

October 29, 1985

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

We recently requested that you include on the Geneva Summit agenda the 32 Soviet SALT violations which you have officially confirmed to the U.S. Congress. Thus we are very pleased that you have responded by stating at the UN:

> We feel it will be necessary at Geneva to discuss with the Soviet Union what we believe are their violations of a number of the provisions in all these agreements...

In our judgment, no new U.S.-Soviet arms control treaty can receive the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate for ratification until the Soviets reverse this pattern of "break-out" from arms control. We believe that a Summit confrontation on all Soviet violations of existing treaties is absolutely essential to preserve the credibility and prospects for improving international security through arms control.

But in addition to the 32 you have officially certified, we believe that new revelations on the eve of the Summit will require us to face the fact of five dangerous new Soviet SALT violations.

Secretary Weinberger has just confirmed that the Soviets have deployed a mobile SS-25 "second new type" ICBM forbidden in the SALT II agreement. This violation implies other developments which trigger at least four more violations, for a total of five (explained in detail in the attached Annex):

1. Credible press reports indicate that there are 45 mobile launchers for these forbidden SS-25s already deployed, with indications from new construction that upwards of 200 will ultimately be deployed. This indicates that the Soviets may already be exceeding the 2,504 number of missiles and

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/04/28 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001101480011-2

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/04/28 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001101480011-2

bombers they had when SALT II was signed in 1979, and are grossly exceeding the 2,250 SALT II ceiling.

2. Since these 45 SS-25s are capable of carrying MIRV warheads, it appears that the Soviets must be in violation of the most important SALT II ceiling limiting MIRVed ICBM launchers to 820.

3. Moreover, the deployment of the SS-25s defeats the object and purpose of the indefinitely-extended SALT I Interim Agreement.

4. Finally, the deployment of SS-25s supported from old SS-7 ICBM facilities violates the SALT I ICBM dismantling procedures.

We note that this action of the Soviets, and the violations that are implied by the action, constitute an attempt by the Soviets to increase tensions. Perhaps this is what the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev meant when he described the international situation as "explosive" and threatened the United States with "rough times" ahead.

We request that you include these five new violations in the forthcoming report which you have mandated, namely, the "Response to Soviet Violations Paper," known as the RSVP report and scheduled for release on November 15.

Finally, Mr. President, we urge you to raise them with the Soviets at the Summit. We urge you to raise them with the American people. We believe that the American people support a proportionate response to actions which break out of the arms control process. We suggest that the appropriate forum to explain this problem would be a Joint Session of Congress, televised to the nation and the whole world by satellite.

Respectfully,



Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/04/28 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001101480011-2

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/04/28 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001101480011-2

Annex: Analysis of New Soviet SALT Violations

As you know, nine of us sent letters to you on September 9 and October 4, 1985, requesting that you confront Soviet leader Gorbachev with the 32 Presidentially confirmed Soviet SALT Break Out violations at the November 19-20 1985 Geneva Summit meeting. A new and authoritative poll indicates that two thirds of the American People agree with you that the Soviets are violating all the existing arms control treaties, so your concerns about Soviet cheating are supported by a solid majority. Americans should be encouraged by your recent statement to the United Nations General Assembly on October 24, confirming the inclusion of our request as part of the agenda for the impending Summit:

> "... We feel it will be necessary at Geneva to discuss with the Soviet Union what we believe are their violations of a number of the provisions in all these agreements ..." [The agreements you specifically cited as being violated were the "ban on biological and toxin weapons, the 1975 Helsinki accords on human rights and freedoms," and the SALT I Agreement-Treaty and SALT II Treaty "on strategic weapons."]
>
> Americans will also be encouraged by Defense Secretary Weinberger's recent statement:
>
> "... I'm sure the President will raise these violations [at the Summit] because they are very relevant to any agreement that is signed in the future ... I'm quite sure he will make the points again ..." (Interview with Allan Rryskind, Human Events, October 26, 1985)

The Soviets are understandably quite sensitive to our widely shared concerns about their expanding pattern of arms control Break Out violations. Soviet news agency TASS severely attacked our letters on October 9. Obviously, no new U.S. - Soviet arms control treaty can receive the advice and consent of two thirds of the Senate, for you to ratify it, until the Soviets reverse their Break Out Violations of existing SALT treaties. A Summit confrontation on all their violations is absolutely essential to preserve the prospects for improving international security through arms control.

Dangerous New Soviet SALT Violations On The Eve of The Summit

But ominously, Mr. President, on the very eve of the Summit, several new Soviet SALT violations have been revealed which cast a dark shadow over the prospects for world peace through arms control. We are alarmed by Defense Secretary Weinberger's recent confirmation on October 22 that the Soviet Union has now

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/04/28 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001101480011-2

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/04/28 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001101480011-2

operationally deployed its mobile SS-25 second "new type" ICBM (Soviet SS-25 deployment directly violates SALT II's Article IV Paragraph 9 prohibition on deploying more than one "new type" ICBM, while flight-testing and constructing fixed and mobile deployed launchers for their second new type SS-24 ICBM. Previously, you have confirmed to Congress that Soviet flight-testing of the SS-25 was a clearcut, "irreversible" SALT II violation, because SALT II Article IV Paragraph 9 bans the flight-testing of more than one "new type" ICBM. Moreover, you have already confirmed that the SS-25's covert MIRV capability and the full encryption of its flight-test telemetry were also clearcut, unqualified Soviet SALT II violations.)

The timing of the confirmed SS-25 deployment banned by SALT II coming just before the Summit, has dangerous implications for American national security, especially when Soviet leader Gorbachev is describing the international situation as "explosive" and threatening "rough times" ahead for the U.S. if we do not knuckle under to Soviet demands, as State Department accommodationists are urging.

We therefore request that you officially confirm in public for the benefit of the Congress and the American People, on an urgent basis before the Summit, the following further Soviet violations which we believe result directly from the now confirmed Soviet SS-25 deployment banned by SALT II. These direct results of SS-25 deployment entail over four even more serious Soviet violations of both SALT I and II:

Two More New Soviet SALT II Violations

1. Credible press reports indicate that the Soviets have recently deployed over 48 mobile ICBM launchers, which exceed even the 2,504 number of Soviet Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNDVs) which they deceptively claimed to have when the SALT II Treaty was signed in June, 1979. Moreover, over 20 bases for the mobile SS-25 are reportedly under construction, indicating an eventual SS-25 force of well over 200 mobile launchers.

There was no agreed Soviet ceiling of 2,504 SNDVs in the SALT II Treaty. The agreed SNDV ceiling, to be common to both sides, was 2,250. But in June 1982, your State Department secretly "agreed" with the Soviets that their forces could be "capped" at their claimed higher, June 1979 level of 2,504, without, however, the U.S. having the right to the same number. As you recall, the original SALT II Treaty was already unequal, unbalanced, destabilizing, and not in the U.S. national security interest, in the opinion of the Senate Armed Services Committee. In 1980, you termed SALT II "fatally flawed" and "illegal" because it was "unequal." But the State Department's 1982 secret agreement

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/04/28 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001101480011-2

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/04/28 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001101480011-2

concession converted SALT II into an even more unequal treaty than before. This explicit U.S. agreement to unequal levels also was inconsistent with the 1972 Jackson Amendment to SALT I, requiring equal levels of forces in SALT II, and because it secretly constrained U.S. forces by Executive Agreement alone, we believe it also was inconsistent with the Treaty-making power of the Constitution and contrary to Section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.

Therefore, the recently confirmed deployment of over 48 SS-25 mobile ICBM launchers, together with indications of an intended force of over 200 SS-25s totally banned by SALT II, reveals that the Soviets are now grossly exceeding even this 2,504 deceptive, concessionary, unequal ceiling. Moreover, their 50 plus new Bear H Bombers, their 300 plus intercontinental Backfire bombers, and of course their 200 illegally deployed mobile SS-16 ICBMs, which they failed to acknowledge in the June 1979 SALT II Data Exchange, also grossly exceed this ceiling.

2. Confirmed Soviet deployment of over 48 mobile SS-25 ICBM launchers also violates the most important SALT II ceiling, the limit of 820 MIRVed ICBM launchers. This is because you have already confirmed to Congress that the SS-25 has a covert MIRV capability, and the Soviets already have 818 MIRVed SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 silo launchers. Given the Soviet history of deception and cheating, we must consider a covert MIRV capability to be exploited operationally, (The National Intelligence Estimate for this year reportedly concludes that the Soviets have done this with their superheavy SS-18 ICBM, deploying 14 MIRV warheads on each one when SALT II allows only 10, another serious SALT II violation, by the way.) Thus Soviet deployment of any more than only 2 covertly MIRV-capable SS-25 mobile ICBM launchers violates the crucial SALT II ceiling on MIRVed ICBMs, which are the most dangerous weapons in the world. In December, 1983, the Soviets reportedly told the U.S. that they intended to violate this key ceiling, along with the related ceilings on MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs and bombers equipped with long-range cruise missiles. Now they have grossly violated these ceilings.

Mr. President, we hope that these three serious new Soviet SALT II violations will finally convince the State Department to allow the unratified SALT II Treaty to expire in December under its own terms, so that we will not have to dismantle after all the first perfectly good Poseidon submarine, now scheduled to be cut up on November 28, after the Summit. As you are aware, we may have to pursue Constitutional, legal, and legislative remedies against the State Department if U.S. compliance with the unequal, unratified SALT II Treaty continues past December.

Two More New Soviet SALT I Violations

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/04/28 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001101480011-2

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/04/28 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001101480011-2

3. In May, 1972, the U.S. warned in Unilateral Statement B to the SALT I Interim Agreement that Soviet deployment of mobile ICBMs would be "inconsistent with the objectives" of SALT I. The SALT I Interim Agreement was jointly extended indefinitely by the U.S. and the USSR in October, 1977, by parallel statements. (This extension was approved by Congress, but with the McClure caveat that no U.S. strategic force options for research and development should be constrained.) The 1972 U.S. Unilateral Statement thus warned the Soviets that the U.S. would consider that mobile ICBM deployment would defeat the object and purpose of the Agreement. Mobile SS-25 deployment must therefore be regarded as defeating the object and purpose of SALT I, and thus can also be considered a serious violation.

4. Your Presidential Report to Congress of February 1, 1985 stated that Soviet deployment of mobile SS-25 ICBM launchers at old SS-7 complexes would be a "future violation" of the SALT I ICBM Dismantling Procedures agreed in July, 1974. The SS-25's now confirmed deployment therefore violates the SALT I Dismantling Procedures, because the SS-25s are reportedly being supported from old SS-7 ICBM support facilities at the Yurya and Yoshkar-Ola old SS-7 complexes, which is directly prohibited by the Dismantling Procedures. Why should the U.S. dismantle Poseidon submarines, when the Soviets are violating the ICBM Dismantling Procedures?

Mr. President, these two new Soviet SALT I violations make it all the more imperative that you withdraw the erroneous statements from your June 10, 1985 Report to Congress inserted by the detentist "permanent government" State Department bureaucracy, saying that 'the Soviets have complied with the letter of SALT I and with its limits on ICBMs and SLBMs.' Not only did these erroneous statements contradict your own 1978 statement that the Soviets had repeatedly violated the "entire spirit and terms of SALT I," but they totally contradict our own 1980 and 1984 Republican Party Platform attacks on the "Carter cover-up of Soviet SALT I violations." Moreover, your own arms control General Advisory Committee Report of October 1984 confirms three even more serious Soviet SALT I violations: heavy SS-19 ICBM deployment, exceeding SLBM ceilings, and deliberate camouflage and concealment.

Other Soviet Actions Increasing Nuclear War Risk

Finally, the Soviets are reportedly provocatively violating the 1971 Agreement to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War, by:

a) Electronically jamming U.S. strategic early warning detection systems;

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/04/28 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001101480011-2

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/04/28 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001101480011-2

b) Failing to notify the U.S. of this prohibited jamming, as required; and

c) Failing to notify the U.S. of the early April 1984 salvo launch of multiple Soviet SS-20s on a prohibited azimuth directly toward the U.S., as required.

Mr. President, these Soviet provocations, together with the Presidentially confirmed Soviet violations of the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement ending the Cuban Missile Crisis, endanger U.S. national security by increasing the risk of nuclear war. We again warn you to be wary of Gorbachev's nuclear blackmail threats, playing upon understandable Western fears of nuclear war.

Conclusion: Necessity For Proportionate Responses

In conclusion, we await the Defense Department's Response to Soviet Violations Paper, due to you by November 15, because we need to make use of it in preparing our own study of proportionate responses to the Soviet SALT violations, which we intend to use for amendments to the proposed emergency FY 1986 Soviet Arms Control Compliance Supplemental Defense Authorization Request.

We believe that the State Department's unfounded restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty has crippled your own Strategic Defense Initiative, making $26 billion for mere SDI research over 20 years a tragic waste of ever scarcer defense funds. Such an interpretation simply constitutes U.S. unilateral disarmament and appeasement. The State Department has already in effect traded away your SDI, even before the Summit, and for no quid pro quo at all in Soviet restraint. We do not support a double standard for the Soviet Union, allowing their SALT I and II Break Out Violations and massive strategic buildup, while the U.S. is enmeshed in the self-imposed strait-jacket of unilateral SALT compliance. Continued full U.S. compliance with the unequal SALT I Interim Agreement (originally intended for only five year's duration) and the unequal, unratified SALT II Treaty is unilateral disarmament and appeasement. A majority of the American People seem to agree that the U.S. should not comply with arms control treaties that the Soviets are violating. Proportionate responses to Soviet SALT violations have been overwhelmingly endorsed by Congress and the American People, and are necessary to preserve U.S. national security. The time for "going the extra mile" and for making a "fresh start" in U.S. - Soviet relations is unfortunately past, except in the unlikely event that the Soviets agree at the Summit to immediately reverse their SALT Break Out Violations. Our sworn Constitutional duty,

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/04/28 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001101480011-2

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/04/28 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001101480011-2

like yours, is to preserve the "Common Defense" This requires proportionate responses supported by the American People.

We thank you for responding positively to our requests, and we remain your strong supporters, especially in these dangerous times of crisis Summitry with the Soviets.

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/04/28 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001101480011-2

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/04/28 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001101480011-2

According to an EPA internal document, about five accidents involving leaks of toxic substances occur every day. The authors base their conclusions on a partially complete data base, the best available, which covers only part of the United States. When extrapolated to the entire country, the true accident rate is probably several times higher.

EPA is also slow in producing the emergency plans needed for preventing spills of dangerous substances into our waterways. The Agency has had since 1972 to prepare a final hazardous spill prevention plan required by the Clean Water Act but produced no regulation.

The same Agency produced only five standards for individual hazardous air pollutants since 1970, despite the hundreds which it admits are emitted into the air.

It is time to start regulating these substances before the next Bhopal happens here.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN UGANDA

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, on July 27, 1985, an army coup led by Lt. Gen. Tito Okello toppled the government of Apollo Milton Obote.

The U.S. Committee for Refugees reports that when Mr. Okello took office "1 out of every 14 Ugandans was a refugee or displaced. Approximately 300,000 Ugandans remained outside the country's borders as refugees. As many as 950,000 more were internally displaced from their homes and farms, but remained within Uganda in a refugee-like situation."

In August 1984, the U.S. Department of State publically condemned the human rights record of the Obote government as "horrendous" and "among the most grave in the world." It estimates that as many as 100,000 to 200,000 Ugandans died since the overthrow of Amin. Other sources claim casualties were between 300,000 and 500,000.

Unfortunately, Uganda's recent history is the story of failed leadership. Mr. Okello's predecessors practiced genocide. Government officials and army officers, unable to overcome religious, ethnic, and tribal differences, resorted to widespread torture and detention of civilians.

Mr. President, Mr. Okello's tenure as ruler of Uganda will be difficult. Uganda's complex political and social organizations will test his strength and resolve. I wish him well.

Uganda remains rich in potential to become a nation that safeguards human rights. Under Mr. Okello Uganda can once again reclaim its title as the "pearl of Africa." The development of human rights protection in Uganda will be slow and tedious. Behavior will not change overnight.

Mr. President, the United States must send a message of hope and caution to Mr. Okello. The U.S. Senate must ratify the Genocide Treaty making clear to him and the world that we oppose the heinous crime of genocide. Our ratification will demonstrate that we shall hold him accountable for the preservation and protection of human rights in Uganda.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the special order which was reserved for me be reserved for the Democratic leader, Senator BYRD, in view of the fact that I used his leader time this morning.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

RECOGNITION OF SENATOR WILSON

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from California is recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes.

Mr. WILSON. I thank the Chair.

CONTROL OF TIME

Mr. WILSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the special order in favor of the majority leader be under the control of the Senator from California.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. WILSON. I ask unanimous consent that the special order in favor of the President pro tempore be reserved for his use later in the day.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. WILSON. Mr. President, I yield to my distinguished friend, the senior Senator from Idaho (Mr. MCCLURE).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.

PRESERVING DETERRENCE THROUGH U.S. STRATEGIC STRENGTH

Mr. MCCLURE. Mr. President, I thank my friend from California for yielding. I also thank him for the significant leadership he is providing to the Senate in giving the opportunity to several of us to cooperate with him in the effort of examining the United States negotiating and military-foreign relations posture with respect to the Soviet Union.

Mr. President, I would like to speak again today about the U.S. strategic defense initiative and the correct, sound "fully justifiable" way to interpret the SALT I Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

In September 1972, the Soviet Minister of Defense, the late Marshal Grechko, stated: "The ABM Treaty places no limitations whatsoever on the conducting of research and experimental work directed toward solving the problems of defending the country from nuclear missile strikes." I agree with President Reagan that the Soviets are way ahead of us in SDI and Asat development, and one reason they are ahead is that they have not let the ABM Treaty interfere with their SDI and Asat development and testing. Neither should the United States, because only SDI deployment is restricted under the ABM Treaty.

I believe that the State Department's unfounded "restrictive" interpretation of the SALT I ABM Treaty has crippled President Reagan's strategic defense initiative. Under the State Department's unfounded "restrictive" interpretation, the United States would spend about $26 billion for mere SDI research over the next 20 years. To do no more than mere research for 20 years would be a tragic waste of our ever scarcer defense funds. The State Department's unfounded restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty binding us but not the U.S.S.R. simply constitutes U.S. unilateral disarmament, as I said on the Senate floor last week.

The State Department has already in effect traded away President Reagan's SDI, even before the summit, and for no quid pro quo at all in Soviet arms restraints.

I do not support a double standard on SALT compliance for the Soviet Union, allowing their SALT I and SALT II break out violations and massive strategic buildup, while the United States is enmeshed in the self-imposed straitjacket of unilateral SALT compliance. Indeed, Mr. President, keeping the United States SDI under the restrictive interpretation is a way of putting off for 20 years a crucial decision needing to be made today, here and now, dealing with the urgent threat to America of Soviet offensive and defensive superiority. If America will not face up now to the necessity of responding proportionately to Soviet SALT break out violations and their massive military buildup, will we be any more likely or able to respond 5 years into the future, when the Soviets will be even stronger and we will be even weaker? I believe that it is imperative that the U.S. SDI Program be restructured as soon as possible to be consistent with the President's "fully justifiable" interpretation of the ABM Treaty that all SDI research, development, and testing is fully legal. This would means U.S. SDI technology demonstration tests so soon as possible.

Mr. President, it was recently reported that the Soviets have offered to stop construction of their Krasnoyarsk ABM battle management radar, which President Reagan has confirmed is an "outright," "clear," and "direct" violation of the ABM

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/04/28 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001101480011-2

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/04/28 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001101480011-2

Treaty, in exchange for the United States refraining from modernizing two overseas radars which were not even covered by the ABM Treaty.

According to Defense Department drawings of the Krasnoyarsk radar derived from U.S. Intelligence, it is externally physically already completed. Hence the Soviets could easily agree to "stop" constructing it, while secretly continuing to install its internal electronic equipment. It will be operational by 1987, without any further detectable activity. Such a brazen deception would not be uncommon at all for the Soviets, given their record of past negotiating deceptions, operational camouflage, concealment, and deception ("Maskirovka" in Russian) and outright arms control treaty violations. Already, in the last 3 years, for example, two Soviet leaders have twice proposed a unilateral Soviet moratorium on their own SS-20 deployment program, while continuing just the same with deploying SS-20's. So the United States should be wary of foregoing the perfectly legitimate modernization of the Thule, Greenland and Fryingdales, England early warning radars not even covered by the ABM Treaty, in exchange for an almost certainly deceptive Soviet concession. I ask unanimous consent that the article by William Safire in yesterday's New York Times entitled "Krasnoyarsk Chutzpah" be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Oct. 31, 1985]

KRASNOYARSK CHUTZPAH

(By William Safire)

WASHINGTON.—The Soviet Union, which wants to block our space-based missile defense, has been caught redhanded with an illegal ground-based missile defense—but refuses to give it up.

On July 27, 1983, the syndicated columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak reported that a top-secret warning had been sent by U.S. intelligence to the White House: an immense radar system was being built in Siberia in violation of the ABM treaty.

That column turned out to be the scoop of the year. A week later, Senator James McClure wrote President Reagan asking for a closed-session briefing on what he termed "the most flagrant Soviet SALT violation yet." The next week, The New York Times confirmed the concern of intelligence officials at the satellite photos of the new radar installation the size of two football fields near Krasnoyarsk.

Three months before this disclosure, President Reagan surprised the world with his idea for changing the basis of nuclear deterrence: no longer would we rely on "mutual assured destruction," enshrining vulnerability in a balance of terror, but we would seek to build a defense against incoming missiles.

Build defenses? That notion horrified the MAD crowd, which believes that nakedness is strength. "Concerned Scientists" rushed into print with predictions that a shield could never be devised. Russians joined in the furious derogation of "Star Wars" defense, which would leapfrog the Soviet advantage in offense.

But there was a glaring weakness in the Soviet-MAD argument: the news that the Russians were building a missile-targeting radar in their heartland meant that the Soviet Union, in violation of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, was building its own defense. If the Russians were cheating by building a secret defense, then the argument against an open U.S. defense collapsed.

That is why the American doves refused to believe the story of the Krasnoyarsk radar. It had to be a concoction of right-wing extremists bent on ruining traditional arms control doctrine. Doves preferred the Russian explanation: just listening to messages from space.

That is also why some of us hardliners have been hitting the Krasnoyarsk violation so hard. Stop for a moment of background. The Nixon-Brezhnev deal allows for "early warning" radars on the periphery of our mutual defenses, but only one local defense against missiles. The Russians chose to build a local defense around Moscow; we chose to build none. Their permitted Moscow ABM includes a battle-management radar to plot the trajectories of hundreds of incoming missiles simultaneously, enabling ground-based missiles to shoot them down.

Now here's the rub: The building in Krasnoyarsk is the same, in size and signals, as the radar installation near Moscow that the Russians freely assert is designed to target incoming ICBM's. (Russian technocrats stick to one set of plans.) The only real difference is that the radar at Krasnoyarsk is a treaty violation; it means the Russians are putting a rudimentary national missile defense in place.

In other words, they may have already begun to deploy "Ground Wars"—a ground-based defense against missiles in their reentry stage—while complaining about our prospective testing of Star Wars, a space-based defense against missiles in their launch stage.

At this point, with a summit approaching and the blatant Krasnoyarsk violation making their antidefense argument untenable, the Russians could (a) admit the violation and shut it down, (b) admit nothing but dismantle their illegal radar, (c) wreck their attack on the U.S. space-defense plan by doing nothing.

Mr. Gorbachev chose a bolder fourth course: he offers to "stop building" his defenses at Krasnoyarsk (outside, that is—inside, the electronic work goes on) in return for abandonment of U.S. plans to upgrade a couple of our early-warning radars that the treaty permits.

Talk about chutzpah: we'll hold our violation at its present level, he says, but you have to pay for it.

True to form, our MADmen embrace this cynical ploy as evidence of his conciliation, and promptly cast suspicion on modernizing our peripheral early-warning system.

Don't be fooled: the Krasnoyarsk radar defense is evidence of the Soviet drive to put a national ABM in place. It proves that Mr. Gorbachev does not care if his treaty-breaking stands exposed. Mr. Reagan is duty bound to insist on complete dismantling of "Ground Wars" before discussion of limiting deployment of other defenses can begin.

Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, I would now like to compare Soviet strategic defenses with the United States SDI. But at the outset, we should recognize that the Soviet SDI, space-based ABM based on "other physical principles," and the Soviet Asat, are way ahead of the United States, as President Reagan has stated. Dr. Robert Jastrow has also said that the Soviets are ahead of us in SDI.

Regrettably, the President's goal of a stable transition to deployment of strategic defenses will be unattainable in the 1990's or beyond if the United States is unable to deter the Soviets from illegal land-based ABM deployments in the 1980's. The United States cannot expect to deter illegal land-based Soviet ABM deployments in the 1980's without reorienting our own strategic defense initiative.

The Soviet Union has the only operational ABM system, the only open production lines for ABM interceptor missiles and mobile ABM radars, open production lines for two types of mobile SAM interceptors and mobile radars capable of ABM use, and far more extensive air defenses and civil defenses than does the United States. Moreover, because Soviet offensive forces have over three times the warheads and six times the counterforce capability of the United States Forces, it is unrealistic for the United States to assume that modernization of United States offensive Forces alone will deter further Soviet ABM deployments. And again, the Soviets are way ahead in SDI development and testing and in Asat deployment. The United States can only deter the Soviets from additional illegal ABM deployments, if at all, by developing a capability and readiness for selective deployment of at least a limited American—and possibly also a NATO—land-based ABM system before the close of this decade. The United States SDI as currently structured under the restrictive State Department interpretation of the ABM Treaty has not deterred Soviet breakout from the SALT I ABM Treaty.

The Congress must work with the President to prevent further erosion of the U.S. strategic deterrent. Before the next Defense budget is requested in January 1986, the United States must review land-based ABM system development options, and must work jointly with NATO allies to expedite development activities before the Soviets destroy the ABM Treaty in its entirety. Those arms control commitments that have any chance of surviving Soviet indifference to legal obligations depend upon United States and allied safeguards programs that strengthen incentives for arms control compliance. But even more importantly, the United States must restructure SDI into a robust, ambitious, technology demonstration program as soon as possible.

Let me review the Soviet land-based strategic defense programs of the last 20 years, before turning to the necessity of building practicality into the United States strategic defense initiative.

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/04/28 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001101480011-2

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/04/28 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001101480011-2

THE SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE, 1965-85

THE MOSCOW ABM SYSTEM

The Soviets began deploying the original Moscow ABM system in the early 1960's, and even before the 1972 ABM Treaty they began research on the newer Moscow system now almost fully deployed and by 1987 to be augmented by completion of the Pushkino radar.

DUAL PURPOSE SAM AND ABM MISSILE AND RADAR NETWORK

Also in the early 1960's the Soviets began development of a high altitude surface-to-air missile with a range of about 300 kilometers. U.S. intelligence calls this missile the SA-5. It became the most widely deployed surface-to-air missile in the Soviet Union. There are about 2,000 SA 5 interceptors deployed. This surface-to-air missile was the only Soviet SAM missile deployed with a range significantly greater than 100 kilometers. Credible press reports indicate that the SA-5 has nuclear warheads, and has been tested in an ABM mode over 60 times between 1973 and 1977.

The Soviets made no secret of the fact that this SA-5 rocket was designed with both an air defense and an ABM variant, but once the Soviets signed the ABM Treaty of 1972, the Soviet press began to refer to this SAM missile and associated radars only as an antiaircraft system. Why, after ABM Treaty ratification in 1972, did the Soviets continue to test the SA-5 interceptor missile concurrently with tests of ABM radars? Why, after ABM Treaty ratification, did the Soviets continue to test SA-5 radars during ballistic missile tests? Why did the Soviets resume concurrent testing of SAM system components and ABM system components, after United States complaints in 1975 in the Standing Consultative Commission? Why have the Soviets continued concurrent testing of SA-5, SA-10, and SA-12 missiles and radars in an ABM mode even after SCC agreements in 1978 and 1985 banning just such testing?

The answer should be obvious: The Soviet Union circumvented the ABM Treaty limit of 100 missile interceptors by developing and deploying dual purpose air defense and ballistic missile defense systems. And the dual purpose SA-5 SAM and ABM interceptor threat of the 1970's has been augmented by the SA-10—low altitude—and SA-12—high altitude dual purpose—SAM and ABM interceptor threat of the 1980's. Thus the Soviets have three kinds of SAM's which have a built in ABM capability, and which have been thoroughly tested in the ABM mode. And two of these systems are mobile, and all three are in mass production.

A SOVIET ADMISSION THAT SAM'S HAVE ANTI-ICBM CAPABILITIES

A Soviet military attache in Washington admitted in June 1983 to an American academic arms control expert that both American and Soviet translators have recurringly mistranslated the Russian phrase zenitnykh raketnykh kompleksov to mean antiaircraft missile complexes, when this term also applies to missiles with an antiballistic missile capability. This was an extraordinary, extremely important admission. According to the account of the American academic arms control expert:

When asked if he meant that Soviet "antiaircraft missiles" had a capability to hit U.S. ICBMs, the Soviet military attache answered "yes" and elaborated without any prompting that Soviet weapons builders had the knowledge to make "anti-aircraft missiles" effective against U.S. ICBMs and did so.

To check that we were in fact talking about the same thing, the American expert noted that the 1972 ABM Treaty and its 1974 protocol limited each country to only 100 ABM missiles. The American expert asked directly if what the Soviet military attache was saying meant that the Soviets had broken the Treaty.

The Soviet military attache responded with a question—"What did you want us to do, not use the knowledge we had?"

The American expert asked again if the Soviet military attache meant the Soviet Union had already broken the Treaty.

This time the Soviet military attache gave no verbal answer, merely shrugging his shoulders . . . .

The American expert got the impression that the Soviet military attache was fully aware of what he was saying. His English is excellent. He made no attempt to dissuade the American from the idea that the Soviets had broken the ABM Treaty.

This account is one of the best pieces of evidence that Soviet surface-to-air missiles and radars have an ABM capability. At Geneva recently, a top Soviet arms negotiator also admitted to an American official that Soviet SAM's had an ABM capability, thus confirming the 1983 Soviet military attache statement. Much technical evidence also supports this conclusion, and President Reagan has stated that it is "highly probable" that Soviet SAM's have been tested in the ABM mode.

Defense Secretary Weinberger stated yesterday on October 31, 1985, in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that because of the SA-10 and SA-12 ABM capability, the Soviets now have "some nationwide ABM capability." But this is specifically prohibited by Article I of the ABM Treaty. So here is yet another altogether new Soviet ABM Treaty violation confirmed by the Secretary of Defense.

A CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TO U.S. DETERRENCE

The Soviets have deployed a multitiered system of defense against ballistic missiles that is a "clear and present danger" to United States deterrence. The Soviet program accelerated after the United States unilaterally dismantled the 100-interceptor ABM defense of a Minuteman ICBM field in 1975. Since that time the United States has had no operational ABM system. The United States has had no ABM interceptor production lines open. The United States has had no ABM development program designed for rapid deployment in event of Soviet breakout from the ABM Treaty. In short, the collapse of the U.S. ABM program in the early 1970's and the long term design of the strategic defense initiative of the 1980's under the State Department restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty, have left the United States without a capability to deter Soviet ABM deployments.

THE SOVIETS HAVE DEPLOYED A MULTITIERED SYSTEM OF DEFENSE AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILES

The Soviets have illegally developed mobile ABM radar systems for at least a decade, as reported in two Presidential reports to the Congress (the GAC report, January 1984; the Interagency report, February 1985.)

As noted, the Soviets have concurrently tested ABM components and surface-to-air missile [SAM] components, and many of these tests were probable violations and some "highly probable violations" according to the Interagency Presidential report of February 1985.

The October 1985 Defense Department report, "Soviet Strategic Defense Programs," acknowledges that the Soviets have at least 10,000 air defense radars and about 12,000 SAM interceptor launchers presently deployed. The October 1985 DOD report on "Soviet Strategic Defense Programs" also acknowledges that the SA-12 and SA 10 SAM's provide a two-tiered defense, high- and low-altitude, with a capability to intercept incoming ballistic missiles. This is highly significant.

While the United States watched for ABM treaty breakout, the Soviets engaged in concurrent testing of overly capable air defense systems, deployed these dual-purpose SAM and ABM systems by the thousands, and are nearing completion of the last long lead item, the Krasnoyarsk radar, expected to be operational by 1987. A new radar at Pushkino will give the Moscow ABM system enhanced capabilities, also by 1987. This Soviet complete, nationwide defense is only 1 short year away from being fully operational. This is an urgent, dangerous threat to U.S. deterrence.

The Krasnoyarsk ballistic missile detection and tracking radar is in the north central sector of a large ellipse containing "strategic SAM concentrations." According to the October 1985 DOD report, pages 9, 16.

We must stop thinking of this radar as the first important violation of the ABM Treaty, but rather, as the last essential phase of an illegal Soviet territorial defense. This is because the Krasnoyarsk radar system "closes the last remaining gap in Soviet ballistic missile detection coverage," as reported in the October 1985 report, "Soviet Strategic Defense Programs."

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/04/28 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001101480011-2

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/04/28 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001101480011-2

A POLICY OF UNPREPAREDNESS CANNOT DETER SOVIET BREAKOUT FROM THE ABM TREATY

If the United States limits its strategic defense program at the research phase, the United States cannot deter illegal Soviet ABM deployments, because the United States has no operating ABM system, no open production lines for ABM's, and inadequate offensive forces, at an over 6 to 1 disadvantage, to deter Soviet ABM deployments.

THE SOVIETS HAVE CIRCUMVENTED THE DEPLOYMENT LIMITS THAT ARE THE HEART OF THE ABM TREATY

As Ambassador Smith said on May 26, 1972, article III which limits ABM deployments in the heart of the ABM Treaty. But with thousands of Soviet dual purpose SAM and ABM interceptors already deployed, the Soviets have already got a prohibited nationwide and territorial ABM defense. If the deployment limits cannot be preserved from further Soviet encroachments, it is illusory to speak of unilateral U.S. restrictions on lawful SDI development activities, or "harpooning" of the ABM Treaty by exercising legal rights under it.

A U.S. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FOR MOBILE ABM SYSTEMS IS ESSENTIAL IF THE UNITED STATES IS TO REESTABLISH DETERRENCE OF ILLEGAL ABM DEPLOYMENTS

A U.S. testing and development program for fixed, land-based strategic defenses has always been recognized to be permissible. But such a program is, by itself, inadequate to deter further illicit Soviet ABM deployments. Fixed-site, land-based ABM systems are likely to be more vulnerable to attack than are mobile systems. The United States can proceed somewhat further with only land-based testing of components and with mobile testing of subcomponents. But is so limited a development program an effective deterrent?

OVERBREADTH OF ABM INTERPRETATION, 1977-84

It is true that in 1971 some working level negotiators wished to ban testing and development of futuristic ABM systems, but they failed to incorporate any private understandings at the working level into the treaty instruments that bind nations. Why did these negotiators fail to make an explicit part of the treaty a ban on development of "other physical principle" ABM systems? Why do the treaty instruments require predeployment discussions and why do they link this duty to article III—limiting deployments—and not to article V—limiting development? Why does agreed statement D fail to distinguish between fixed, land-based ABM systems and mobile systems?

A U.S. testing and development program for all types of strategic defenses based upon "other physical principles," is legal now, and was interpreted as not illegal in 1972 by those U.S. spokesmen authorized to bind the United States during the ABM ratification process. Every one of the statements in "Documents on Disarmament, 1972," the official annual publication of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, notes that it is deployment of "other physical principle" ABM systems that is prohibited. Not one of these 1972 statements by the President, the Secretary of State or the head of the SALT delegation assert that testing and development of "other physical principle" ABM components were to be prohibited. Thus the interpretation of the ABM Treaty which allows unrestricted SDI development and testing is "fully justifiable," as the President has decided. This is certainly the Soviet interpretation of the ABM Treaty as well, according to Marshal Grechko and to Soviet actions. The Soviet SDI program has been going full speed since the 1960's, no wonder they are ahead.

But starting in 1977—and thereafter reflected in both public writings and in arms control impact statements—several of the U.S. SALT I negotiators who failed to incorporate any explicit predeployment limit on "other physical principles" ABM systems within the treaty instruments, began to write in public as if they had banned the development of mobile laser and directed energy systems. These articles were immediately rebutted, however, by persons who examined both the full set of treaty instruments and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. In particular, article 31 of the Vienna Convention asks us to look only to treaty instruments if these are dispositive, and not to the intent of working level negotiators who lacked the authority to bind their nation—per article 7—and who failed to incorporate their desires in treaty instruments.

If the ABM systems defined in article II are those that were currently foreseeable with sufficient precision to regulate, then the article V limits applied to testing and development of mobile component radars, interceptors, and launchers, but not ABM systems based on "other physicial principles." These are explicitly treated only in agreed statement D, which requires discussions—and implies a need of treaty modification—preceding deployment, but not preceding development.

THE INTENTION OF CERTAIN NEGOTIATORS TO LIMIT FUTURISTIC ABM SYSTEMS WAS THWARTED BY SOVIET NEGOTIATORS

American SALT I negotiators intended to limit much of the ensuing harm of Soviet weapons development and deployment. But despite their good intentions, they failed to limit the quadrupling of the throw-weight of the SS-19 compared to the SS-11 ICBM, they failed to limit Soviet deployment of the mobile SS 16 ICBM, they failed to preclude conversion of dismantled Yankee ballistic missile submarines to even more lethal cruise missile carriers, they failed to prevent increases in defenses by means of the Moscow and Krasnsyarsk territorial ABM complexes, and they failed to prevent the deployment of thousands of dual purpose SAM and ABM interceptors that a Soviet military attaché and a Soviet arms negotiator admit were designed to destroy United States ICBM's. So it should not be surprising if despite their good intentions, certain United States negotiators found that the Soviets kept their options open by keeping out of the ABM Treaty any binding limit on development of ABM systems based on "other physical principles."

RESPONDING TO SOVIET VIOLATIONS

Between January 1984 and June 1985 the President reported on four occasions to the Congress regarding Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements. The unclassified findings are summarized in the following table. I ask unanimous consent that the table and footnotes be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TABLE 1.—PRESIDENTIAL REPORTS TO THE CONGRESS ON SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL OBLIGATIONS STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS AGREEMENTS

Obligation	Issue/Report	GAC report December 2, 1983(1)	Interagency January 23, 1984(2)	Interagency February 11, 1985(3)	President June 10, 1985(4)
1972 ABM Treaty	Deployment of large Krasnoyarsk radar, neither on periphery nor oriented outward, 1981 to present.	Violation	Almost certainly a violation	Violation	Violation.
	Testing and deployment of mobile Flat Twin ABM radar in 1975, and continuing development 1975 to present.	Do	Do	Potential violation	Do.
	Current testing of ABM and SAM components	Do	Do	Highly probable violations	Do.
	Deliberate concealment measures	Do	Do	Do	Do.
	ABM and ABM-related actions in preparation for defense of the national territory.	Do	Do	Potential violation	Serious cause for concern.

(1) Unclassified summary report of the President's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, released October 10, 1984.
(2) Unclassified summary report of NSC Verification and Compliance Interagency Group, FY85 Arms Control Act.
(3) Unclassified summary report of NSC Interagency Group, FY85 Defense Authorization Act.
(4) Unclassified summary report of the President, "Building an Interim Framework for Mutual Restraint," FY85 Defense Authorization Act

Note: The October 1985 Defense-State Department White Paper entitled Soviet Strategic Defense Programs states on page 8: "The silo based [Moscow ABM] launchers may be reloadable." The February, 1985 Report to Congress did not take an unclassified position on the ABM rapid reload issue. This statement entails confirmation of another probable Soviet ABM Treaty violation

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/04/28 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001101480011-2

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/04/28 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001101480011-2

Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President the report of the President's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament declared the continued development of the flat twin mobile ABM radar a "violation," and the February 1, 1985 NSC-coordinated Presidential report termed as "highly probable violations" the concurrent testing of dual purpose ABM and SAM components. The GAC report, and the interagency reports of February 1985 and June 1985 all evaluate the Krasnoyarsk radar as an "outright," "direct," and "clear" "violation." And the last two reports—those of February and June 1985—term a "potential violation" and "serious cause for concern" Soviet ABM and ABM-related actions in preparation for illegal defense of the national territory of the Soviet Union.

Secretary of Defense Weinberger testified yesterday to the Senate Armed Services Committee that the evidence that the Soviet Krasnoyarsk Radar was a violation of the SALT I ABM Treaty was "incontrovertible." He added that our NATO Allies agreed, and expressed their own serious concerns about Soviet ABM Treaty violations.

Before considering whether to suspend the ABM Treaty in whole or in part, it is commendable that the executive branch has recently reviewed with care the scope of permissible activities under the ABM Treaty. If there are actions that are permitted, and that safeguard against additional and illegal Soviet ABM deployments, it is high time that the United States exercise its testing and development rights.

One Member of Congress called the outcome of this recent executive branch legal review "the most pernicious interpretation of a legal requirement since Plesy versus Ferguson," a now overturned Supreme Court case. On the contrary, the President and the executive branch are to be commended for their review of the scope and limits of the ABM Treaty duties. The interpretation of the ABM Treaty allowing research and development of ABM's based on "other physical principles," or SDI, is indeed "fully justifiable," as the President has decided. It was fully justifiable between 1972 and 1977, and it is fully justifiable today. The State Department's "restrictive" interpretation is simply wrong, and should be immediately discarded with the restructured, accelerated US SDI program.

BUILDING PRACTICALITY INTO SDI

The United States simply cannot afford to proceed without a more practical Strategic Defense Program. Soviet resistance to inclusion within the ABM Treaty instruments of any explicit limit on testing and development of "other physical principles" ABM systems has its benefits today. The United States and its NATO allies retain the opportunity to transform a long-range Strategic Defense Program that will deter no one into a practical development program.

Without an operating ABM system and without open ABM production lines, the United States has no other program that has any prospect of reestablishing a credible deterrent against further Soviet breakout from the ABM Treaty. Fixed, land-based ABM systems should be less survivable than mobile systems. But only by an ABM development program for those mobile systems that are lawful to develop, can the United States strengthen Soviet incentives for compliance with deployment limits. Otherwise, the United States will have strategic defense capabilities "too little, and too late." With the budget deficit what it is, defense research and development priorities must emphasize the practical and the attainable:

The fiscal year 1987 budget must accelerate development of components for fixed, land-based ABM systems;

More importantly, the fiscal year 1987 Strategic Defense Programs must establish a development plan for United States and NATO-coordinated development of mobile ABM systems and components based on "other physical principles," such as laser and directed energy systems;

The Secretary of Defense must, by appropriate legislation, be instructed to report to the Congress on development options for strategic defense systems, including effects of arms control obligations, and the design of strategic defense programs to strengthen incentives for mutual arms control compliance.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the following official U.S. Government documents interpreting the 1972 SALT I ABM Treaty be printed in the RECORD for reference purposes. These are excerpts from Documents on Disarmament 1972, an official U.S. Government Arms Control and Disarmament Agency publication. These excerpts include every single reference in that volume to "other physical principles" ABM systems under the ABM Treaty.

Every reference emphasizes that the regulatory line is drawn before deployment. Not once is the line drawn before development.

So the Senate that gave its advice and consent to ratify the 1972 SALT I ABM Treaty, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report that explained it, based its votes on a treaty-instrument derived set of limits and not on the wishful thinking of certain negotiations.

There being no objection, the documents were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[Enclosure 3 to Letter, Harris to Kunsberg, Oct. 1, 1985]

DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT—1972

[News Conference Remarks by Presidential Assistant Kissinger and ACDA Director Smith: Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements, May 26, 1972]

DR. KISSINGER: Gentlemen, I thought that the most useful thing I could do was to give you a general background of these negotiations and of the President's view of the treaty, and Ambassador Smith, of course who has conducted the negotiations and brought them to this conclusion is in the best position to go through the details of the agreement.

First of all, let me say on behalf of the President that he certainly will take occasion to express personally that the reason we are here is the dedication and work of the delegation in Helsinki which has been led by Ambassador Smith. He has come here straight from the airport. He has been working on the final work of this agreement since 5:00 o'clock this morning. This concludes a rather hectic week for everybody who has been connected directly or indirectly with these negotiations.

Let me make a few general observations before I turn this over to Ambassador Smith.

Nothing that this Administration has done has seemed to it more important for the future of the world than to make an important first step in the limitation of strategic arms.

All of us have been profoundly convinced that to arrest the arms race is one of the over-riding concerns of this period. Now it is a subject of enormous technical complexity, and for the two great nuclear powers to make a beginning in putting their armaments under some restraint required political decisions and an enormous amount of technical work.

AMBASSADOR SMITH: • • • radar problems which some of you people perhaps felt we took too long in solving, but much of the time we have spent was in trying to wrestle with this radar problem to prevent the possibility of a nationwide system arising.

In addition to that, the two nations have made commitments not to even try for a thick or regional defense in one part of the country except as specifically permitted under the agreement; that is, to defend one's capital or to defend a relatively small number of ICBM silos.

So, although Article I looks like sort of a general statement, to my mind it is one of the most significant articles in the whole agreement.

Now, Article II defines what we are talking about and has a very important bearing on the whole question of what we call future ABM systems. This treaty has as a most significant aspect that it not only limits the present situation, but has a choking off effect on future systems which, under the terms of the treaty as we have reached understandings, futures will not be deployable unless this treaty is amended.

Article III is the heart of the treaty and deserves a great deal of study. I think we spent more time trying to wrestle with Article III than any other part of the treaty.

I will go into details later if you like, but it says both sides can have two sites with no more than 100 launchers at each site, with radar sharply limited; one site for the defensive capital and one for the ICBM's. The Soviets will agree to deploy the ICBM site well away from the capital site, so the possibility for a base of a nationwide system is very poor.

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/04/28 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001101480011-2

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/04/28 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001101480011-2

[Report by Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon on the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements, June 10, 1972]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 10, 1972.

THE PRESIDENT,
The White House.

THE PRESIDENT: I have the honor to submit to you the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) and the Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Interim Agreement), including an associate Protocol. It is my recommendation that the ABM Treaty be transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

The Interim Agreement, as its title indicates, is an agreement limited in scope and time. It is designed to limit the aggregate number of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers and submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers, and the number of modern ballistic missile submarines, pending the negotiation of a treaty covering more complete limitations of strategic offensive arms. In these circumstances, I am submitting to you the Interim Agreement and its Protocol (which is an integral part of the Agreement), with the recommendation that they be transmitted to both Houses of Congress for approval by a Joint Resolution.

The Interim Agreement can by its terms enter into force only upon the exchange of written notices of acceptance by both countries and only when and if the ABM Treaty is brought into force. Both signatories understand that, pending ratification and acceptance, neither will take any action that would be prohibited by the ABM Treaty or the Interim Agreement and Protocol, in the absence of notification by either signatory of its intention not to proceed with ratification or acceptance.

ABM TREATY

In broad outline, the ABM Treaty, signed on May 26, 1972, provides that:

A nationwide ABM deployment, and a base for such deployment, are prohibited;

An ABM deployment for defense of an individual region is prohibited, except as specifically permitted;

Permitted ABM deployments will be limited to two widely separated deployment areas in each country—one for defense of the national capital, and the other for the defense of ICBMs;

For these purposes no more than 100 ABM launchers and no more than 100 ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites may be deployed within each 150-kilometer radius ABM deployment area, for a total of 200 deployed ABM interceptors and 200 deployed ABM launchers for each Party;

ABM radars will be strictly controlled; radars to support the ABM defense of the national capital may be deployed only in a specified number of small radar complexes within the ABM deployment area; radars to support the ICBM defense will be limited to a specified number within the ABM deployment area and will also be subject to qualitative constraint.

In order to assure the effectiveness of these basic provisions of the Treaty, a number of detailed corollary provisions were also agreed:

Development, testing and deployment of ABM systems or ABM components that are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile-land-based are prohibited;

Deployment of ABM systems involving new types of basic components to perform the current functions of ABM launchers, interceptors or radars is prohibited;

The conversion or testing of other systems, such as air defense systems, or components thereof to perform an ABM role is prohibited.

The Treaty also contains certain general provisions relating to the verification and implementation of the Treaty and to further negotiations:

Each side will use national technical means for verification and the Parties agree not to interfere with such means and not to take deliberate concealment measures;

Development, testing, and other limitations

Article IV provides that the limitations in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or ABM components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. It is understood that ABM test ranges encompass the area within which ABM components are located for test purposes, and that non-phased array radars of types used for range safety or instrumentation purposes may be located outside of ABM test ranges. Article IV further provides that each Party may have no more than a total of 15 ABM launchers at test ranges. The current United States test ranges for ABM systems are located at White Sands, New Mexico and Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific. The current Soviet test range for ABM systems is located near Sary Shagan, Kazakhstan SSR. ABM components are not to be deployed at any other test ranges without prior agreement between the Parties.

Article V limits development and testing, as well as deployment, of certain types of ABM systems and components. Paragraph V(1) limits such activities to fixed, land-based ABM systems and components by prohibiting the development, testing or deployment of ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based. It is understood that the prohibitions on mobile ABM systems apply to ABM launchers and ABM radars which are not permanent fixed types.

Paragraph V(2) prohibits the development, testing, or deployment of ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher; modification of deployed launchers to provide them with such a capability; and the development, testing, or deployment of automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers. The Parties agree that this Article includes an obligation not to develop, test, or deploy ABM interceptor missiles with more than one independently guided warhead.

Future ABM systems

A potential problem dealt with by the Treaty is that which would be created if an ABM system were developed in the future which did not consist of interceptor missiles, launchers and radars. The Treaty would not permit the deployment of such a system or of components thereof capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, launchers, or radars: Article II(1) defines an ABM system in terms of its function as "a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory", noting that such systems "currently" consist of ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers and ABM radars. Article III contains a prohibition on the deployment of ABM systems or their components except as specified therein, and it permits deployment only of ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, and ABM radars. Devices other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars could be used as adjuncts to an ABM system, provided that such devices were not capable of substituting for one or more of these components. Finally, in the course of the negotiations, the Parties specified that "In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty." (As explained below, Article XIII calls for establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission, and Article XIV deals with amendments to the Treaty.)

Undertakings in the ABM treaty

I would like to address first the ABM Treaty.

Under this treaty, both sides make a commitment not to build a nationwide ABM defense. This is a general undertaking of utmost significance. Without a nationwide ABM defense, there can be no shield against retaliation. Both great nuclear powers have recognized, and in effect agreed to maintain, mutual deterrence.

Therefore, I am convinced beyond doubt that the possibility of nuclear war has been dramatically reduced by this treaty.

A major objective of SALT has been to reduce the tensions, uncertainties, and high costs which flow from the upward spiral of strategic arms competition. While the cost savings from these first SALT agreements will be limited initially, over the long term we will save the tens of billions of dollars which might otherwise have been required for a nationwide ABM defense.

Furthermore, with an interim limitation on offensive weapons—which we hope will lead to a more comprehensive and permanent limitation—there will be a break in the pattern of action and reaction under which each side reacts to what the other is doing, or may do, in an open-ended situation. This cycle until now has been a major factor in driving the strategic arms race.

The heart of the treaty is article III, which spells out the provisions under which each of the parties may deploy two limited ABM complexes, one in an ICBM deployment area and one at its national capital. There can be no more than 100 ABM launchers, and 100 associated interceptors, at each complex—a total of 200.

The two ABM deployment complexes permitted each side will serve different purposes. The limited ABM coverage in the ICBM deployment area will afford some protection for ICBM's in the area. ABM coverage at the national capitals will permit protection for the national command authority against a light attack, or an accidental or unauthorized launch of a limited number of missiles, and thus decrease the chances that such an event would trigger a nuclear exchange. In addition, it will buy some time against a major attack, and its radars would help to provide valuable warning.

ABM radars are strictly limited. There are also important limitations on the deployment of certain types of non-ABM radars. The complex subject of radar control was a central question in the negotiations because radars are the long leadtime item in development of an ABM system.

The treaty provides for other important qualitative limitations. The parties will undertake not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based,

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/04/28 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001101480011-2

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/04/28 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001101480011-2

air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based. They have also agreed not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, nor to modify launchers to provide them with such a capability; nor to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semiautomatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers; nor to develop, test, or deploy ABM missiles with more than one independently guided warhead.

Perhaps of even greater importance as a qualitative limitation is that the parties have agreed that future exotic types of ABM systems, i.e., systems depending on such devices as lasers, may not be deployed, even in permitted areas.

One of the more important corollary provisions deals with prohibiting the upgrading of antiaircraft systems, what has been called the "SAM-upgrade" problem. The conversion or testing of other systems, such as air defense systems or components thereof, to perform an ABM role is prohibited as part of a general realistic assessment of the merits of the two agreements taken together.

The treaty contains a general commitment not to build a nationwide ABM defense nor to provide a base for such defense. This general undertaking is supplemented by certain specific provisions. By this general undertaking and the specific commitments, both countries in effect agree not to challenge the effectiveness of each other's missile deterrent capabilities by deploying widespread defenses against them. This means that the penetration capability of our surviving deterrent missile forces can be assured. This, to my mind, bears directly on concerns about a first strike against the United States. As long as we maintain sufficient and survivable retaliatory forces, this new assurance of their penetration capability makes "first strike" as a rational act inconceivable, in my judgment. I believe that this is a development of prime significance for U.S. security.

The treaty, by permitting only a small deployment of ABM's tends to break the offense-defense action-and-reaction spiral in strategic arms competition. The low ABM limits increase the deterrent value of each of our retaliatory offensive missiles. In the long run, we should be able to obtain more deterrence at less cost.

In view of the low ABM levels agreed on, it should be possible in the future to agree on mutual reductions in offensive weapons without impairing strategic stability.

The permitted ABM systems are spelled out in article III. Each party may have two ABM complexes, one in an ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] area and one to defend the national command authority. These complexes are limited in several ways—geographically, in numbers of ABM launchers and missiles (100 at each complex), and in specific constraints on ABM radars.

The two ABM deployments would serve different purposes. ABM coverage of an ICBM area will afford some protection for the ICBM's. ABM coverage at the national capital will provide protection for the national command authority against accidental or unauthorized launch of a small number of missiles and is consistent with the basic purpose of the 1971 U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement on measures to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war. There would also be the additional benefit of increased warning time which should afford opportunity for command decisions if there were a large-scale attack.

Other articles in the treaty supplement the basic provisions of article III. Of special interest are the limitations placed on ABM radars. As the long leadtime item in development of an ABM system, ABM radar was the subject of intense and complex negotiation. There are also limitations on the deployment of certain types of non-ABM radars in order to preclude their possible use as elements of an ABM system.

Qualitative limitations on ABM systems

As a further restraint on ABM capabilities, there are three significant qualitative limitations on ABM systems. Both sides have agreed not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one interceptor missile at a time, not to modify launchers to provide them with such capability, nor to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers.

The development and testing, as well as deployment, of sea-, air-, space-based, and landmobile devices is prohibited. Of perhaps even greater importance, the parties have agreed that no future types of ABM systems based on different physical principles from present technology can be deployed unless the treaty is amended.

To further reinforce the ban on a nationwide ABM defense, another major set of qualitative limitations is the provisions to deal with the SAM-upgrade [surface-to-air missile] problem. Both sides agree that conversion or testing of other systems, such as air-defense systems, or components thereof, to perform an ABM role is prohibited. This is part of the general undertaking not to provide an ABM capability to non-ABM systems.

I do not propose to speak about the confidence with which we can adequately monitor fulfillment of the obligations of these agreements, since I understand that this committee has discussed with previous witnesses the capabilities of our national technical means of verification. We did not work out limitations and then check to see if national technical means were adequate to verify them. We tailored the limitations to fit the capabilities of national technical means of verification.

There is a landmark commitment not to interfere with national technical means of verification. This provision would, for example, prohibit interference with a satellite in orbit used for verification of the treaty. The treaty also contains a commitment not to use concealment measures so as to impede the effectiveness of national technical means of verification. The world should be a more open place as a result of these two undertakings.

The Standing Consultative Commission established by the treaty will permit consideration on a regular basis of the operations of the treaty, including questions of compliance. This is a significant new development in Soviet-American arms control arrangements. The Commission will also have the function of considering proposals to increase the viability of the treaty. We expect that the establishment of the Commission will be a priority matter when SALT II begins.

Although the treaty duration is unlimited, either party can withdraw whenever it decides that extraordinary events relating to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. A six-months' notice of such withdrawal, including a statement of the extraordinary events involved, is required.

SALT AGREEMENTS: CONTRIBUTE TO STRATEGIC BALANCE

The two agreements reached as a result of the ensuing year of negotiating on these difficult questions will contribute to maintaining a stable strategic balance and thereby reduce the likelihood of nuclear war.

In the ABM Treaty, both sides have committed themselves not to build nationwide or heavy ABM defenses. The importance of this undertaking is fundamental. It places both sides in a position where neither will have a substantial defense against major missile attacks. In effect, we agree to maintain mutual deterrence.

I am convinced that the possibility of nuclear war has been dramatically reduced as a result of the ABM Treaty.

BASIC PROVISIONS REVIEWED

I think it would be useful now, Mr. Chairman, for me to run through some of the basic provisions of the two agreements. I will not go into detail since the committee has before it the documents transmitted by the President, which include a detailed article-by-article analysis.

As I said at the beginning, at the conclusion of my remarks, Ambassador Smith will be glad to join with me in answering questions.

Our aim in both agreements has been where necessary—to put detailed obligations in the texts of the agreements themselves.

If one of the sides had a preference for including clarifying material or elaboration in agreed interpretations, and this was sufficient, that approach was used.

The agreed interpretations include initialed statements and other common understandings. They have been included in the President's transmittal package to the Congress.

The transmittal package also included formal unilateral statements of U.S. views in certain cases where agreement could not be reached. There are, Mr. Chairman, and I want to make it clear, there are no secret agreements.

What we have submitted to the Congress represents the agreements that were reached between the Soviet Union and the United States.

THE ABM TREATY

Let me start with the ABM Treaty. It is a definitive agreement of unlimited duration, the central feature of which is the commitment by both sides to no more than a low level of ABM defenses, at two small and widely separated locations.

The treaty permits deployment of one ABM complex in an ICBM deployment area, and one for defense of the National Command Authority. There can be no more than 100 ABM launchers and an equal number of associated interceptors at each complex, for a total of 200.

Strict limitations are placed on ABM radars, a matter of particular importance since radars are the long leadtime item in deployment of an ABM system.

Important limitations are also placed on deployment of certain non-ABM radars to contain their potential for application to an ABM role.

Because of the technical complexity of the radar issues, intense and protracted negotiation was required to resolve them.

QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS ON ABM'S

The commitment to low ABM levels is further enhanced by several important qualitative limitations. We and the Soviet Union have agreed not to develop, test, or deploy:

1. ABM systems or components that are sea based, air based, space based, or mobile land based;

2. Automatic or semiautomatic or other similar systems for rapid reloading of ABM launchers;

3. An interceptor missile with more than one independently guided warhead; and

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/04/28 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001101480011-2

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/04/28 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001101480011-2

4. An ABM laucher capable of launching more than one interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, or to modify launchers to give them such a capability.

Such undertakings are important. It may be of even greater importance that both sides have agreed that future types of ABM systems based on different physical principles, for example, systems depending on such devices as lasers, that do not consist of ABM interceptor missiles, launchers, and radars, cannot be deployed even in permitted areas. So there is a limitation on what may be deployed in the ABM systems now in operation and it prohibits the deployment of new esoteric systems in these areas.

I might note, Mr. Chairman, that limiting ABM's to these low levels will increase the deterrent value of each of our offensive missiles for retaliatory purposes. In the long term it should be possible to achieve greater deterrence at a lower cost.

One of our principal aims in SALT has been to reduce tensions, uncertainties, and high costs which go hand in hand with an upward spiralling strategic arms competition.

We could have maintained a strong strategic posture without the SALT agreements, but in that event, beyond continued expenditures for maintaining a sufficient defense posture in the circumstances of a very low level of Soviet ABM deployment, there would have been heavy pressures as a result of unconstrained arms competition to spend additional billions of dollars for widespread ABM systems and greater offensive forces.

COST SAVINGS FROM SALT AGREEMENTS

Cost savings from these first SALT agreements will be limited initially. It is not possible to predict when particularly significant savings can be achieved, but this is certainly our aim. * * *

[Statement by ACDA Director Smith to House Armed Services Committee, July 25, 1972.]

* * * will be afforded by the ABM coverage permitted for ICBM defense. Protection for the National Command Authority against an accidental or unauthorized launch of a limited number of missiles will be made possible by the ABM coverage at the National Capital; this will decrease the chances that such an attack might trigger a general nuclear exchange. The National Capital ABM complex would also afford a short time for decisionmaking in the event of a major attack.

To assure that these two complexes do not form the beginning of a base for a nationwide system, the two sides agreed that they must be separated by a distance of at least 1,300 kilometers. This separation requirement assures that the second Soviet ABM site will be east of the Ural Mountains.

ABM radars are an essential element of an ABM system and are the long-lead-time item in development of an ABM system. The question of limitations of radars—a highly complex subject—occupied a great deal of time in the negotiations. Specific limitations on ABM radars are spelled out in the treaty. In addition, there are limitations on the deployment of certain types of non-ABM radars in order to preclude the possibility of their use as elements of an ABM system.

In order to assure further that there would be adequate restraints on ABM capabilities, the treaty provides for significant qualitative limitations on ABM systems.

The very low quantitative limitation of 200 ABM launchers for each side cannot be circumvented through qualitative changes. The two sides have agreed not to develop, test, and deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one interceptor missile at a time, not to modify launchers to provide them with such a capability, nor to develop, test or deploy automatic or semiautomatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers.

An additional important qualitative limitation is the prohibition on the development and testing, as well as deployment, of sea, air, space-based and land-mobile ABM systems and components.

Of even greater importance as a qualitative limitation is the prohibition on the deployment of future types of ABM systems that are based on physical principles different from present technology.

On this point, Mr. Chairman, there is an agreed interpretation with respect to ABM systems based on different physical principles, and including components capable of substituting for those components used at present—that is, launchers, missiles and radar components. If such new systems are developed, and one or the other side wants to deploy them under the limitations of this treaty, there would have to first be a discussion of the question in the Standing Consultative Commission we are proposing to establish under this treaty, and then the treaty would have to be amended before such novel ABM systems could be deployed.

To avoid possible circumvention of the ban on a nationwide ABM defense through developments in non-ABM systems, for * * *.

[House Foreign Affairs Committee Report on the Agreement to Limit Strategic Offensive Weapons, Aug. 10, 1972.]

* * * negotiators alternated sessions between Helsinki, Finland, and Vienna, Austria, working out the details of the accords.

During the period of negotiations the Committee on Foreign Affairs was being kept fully abreast of developments. The committee chairman assigned the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments as a forum for regular briefings on progress of SALT. Ambassador Gerard Smith, chief U.S. negotiator, or his representative briefed the subcommittee nine times during the 30-month negotiating period. In addition, SALT-related briefings were scheduled with officials of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense. Several committee members actually visited the sites of the talks for special briefings. Other committees of the House and Senate similarly have availed themselves of the opportunity to be informed about, and consult on, the SALT negotiations.

In fact, the willingness of the Executive to be candid about the U.S. negotiating position and developments at SALT, together with the unblemished record of the Congress in keeping confidential the sensitive information imparted to it, have established a model of executive-legislative cooperation which might well be emulated in other areas related to national strategic policy.

THE SALT ACCORDS

The SALT accords consist of (1) a treaty limiting antiballistic missile systems * and (2) a five-year interim agreement which freezes the overall levels of strategic offensive missile forces pending further negotiations which are to begin in October. There is also a protocol to the interim agreement, and a number of statements of "interpretation," some agreed and some unilateral. The texts may be found in House Document 92-311.

As is customary, the treaty was sent to the Senate for its "advice and consent," while the interim agreement on offensive strategic arms has been submitted to both Houses for approval. Although the House of Representatives is being called upon to pass on only the interim agreement, the two accords are so closely linked that an understanding of both is essential. A summary of the main provisions of each follows:

THE ABM TREATY

Each country agrees not to build an ABM system which could defend its entire territory or a major area thereof. In effect, as Secretary of State Rogers told the committee, both sides are placed in a position where neither would have a substantial defense against major missile attacks. Thus, the current mutual deterrent balance would be maintained.

Each side will limit ABM systems to two sites-one in defense of its national capital, the other in defense of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) field. Sites must be at least 1,300 kilometers (800 miles) apart. That means the Soviet ICBM field to be protected must be east of the Ural Mountains, away from major western U.S.S.R. population and industrial centers.

No more than 100 ABM launchers and 100 interceptor missiles may be deployed at each site.

Limitations are set on numbers, types, and placement of ABM radars to foreclose establishment of a radar capability for nationwide or regional defense of either country.

The two nations additionally agree to ban development, testing or deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-based or land-mobile ABM system. Nor will they deploy ABM systems or components based on new technology without prior discussion and amendment of the treaty. The parties also agree not to convert air-defense systems to an ABM role, or to build early warning radars except along the edges of each country facing outward. Both pledge not to transfer ABM systems to other states or deploy them overseas.

Each party will use its own "national technical means of verification," such as observation satellites, to monitor compliance with the accords. Each pledges not to interfere with those means or resort to deliberate concealment. There is no onsite inspection.

A Standing Consultative Commission will be established to promote implementation of the agreements and to handle questions concerning them, including compliance issues.

The treaty is of unlimited duration but either side may withdraw upon 6 months' notice to the other party that its "supreme interests" have been jeopardized.

The treaty would require the United States to cut back it ABM program from the four sites which have been approved by Congress to a maximum of two. Plans are to finish the ABM site at Grand Forks, N. Dak., which is closest to completion. Work has been halted at the other three sites and Congress has been asked to approve an ABM site for Washington, D.C. The Soviets are permitted to complete the ABM site already under construction around Moscow and to start a second site at an ICBM field.

[12th Annual Report of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Jan. 31, 1973]

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS TALKS

After two and a half years of intensive negotiations, backed by searching analyses and studies, two landmark agreements—the most important to be reached in the history of arms control negotiations—were achieved in May 1972. They are the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. These agreements are the most substantial steps yet taken

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/04/28 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001101480011-2

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/04/28 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001101480011-2

toward curbing the arms race, and bringing about a condition of strategic stability.

ABM Treaty

The ABM Treaty is a definitive long-term agreement which contributes in a fundamental way to our security. The possibility of nuclear war has been dramatically reduced by this Treaty. It sets forth at the outset the joint commitment not to build a nationwide ABM defense nor provide a base for such defense. In this undertaking both countries have, in effect, agreed not to challenge the credibility of each other's deterrent missile forces by deploying a widespread defense against them. This is the central consequence of this Treaty, and its importance to avoidance of nuclear war cannot be overestimated. Both major nuclear powers have agreed that they will not attempt to build a shield against penetration by the other's missile forces which serve to deter nuclear attack.

The ABM Treaty limits the United States and the Soviet Union to two ABM sites each—one for the protection of the national capital, and the other for the defense of an ICBM complex. At each site, there can be no more than 100 ABM launchers and 100 associated interceptor missiles. In addition to numerical limitations on ABM launchers and missiles at each complex, the areas permitted for ABM deployment are limited geographically and in size.

To assure that these two complexes do not form a basis for a nationwide ABM system, the two sides agreed that they must be separated by a distance of at least 1300 kilometers (800 miles). In addition, each ABM system deployment area is restricted to a radius of 150 kilometers (94 miles).

ABM radars are an essential element of an ABM system and are its long-lead-time component. Defining appropriate limits on ABM.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California.

Mr. WILSON. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Indiana.

Mr. QUAYLE. Mr. President, I rise to congratulate my friend and distinguished colleague from California for once again bringing to the Senate's attention the importance of the meeting that will be taking place in Geneva between President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev. I believe he very accurately pointed out five principles that we ought to be concerned about as we approach this very sensitive and important summit.

Mr. President, this is a continuation of a discussion that began last week. I think what precipitated the discussion was the administration's decision to adhere to a narrow, incorrect interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Many felt that this was the beginning of the chipping away of SDI, which the President has strongly supported, which this Senator and others have strongly supported. Senator WILSON has laid out an approach that I hope the administration will follow as they look toward Geneva. I might point out that the President's speech to the United Nations, which I thought was perhaps one of the best he has ever made, laid out in very precise terms how he was going to approach Geneva. He pointed out the regional stability problems, he pointed out the compliance problems, and he pointed out some of the problems that we have in the area of arms control. Just yesterday the President once again reaffirmed those principles. He has developed some specifics on how we can get better stability. He is talking about deep reductions but he is also talking about compliance and moving ahead with developing defense technologies.

Mr. President, I would like to concentrate a moment on the importance of the strategic defense initiative. As I travel around my State and talk to people about arms control and where we ought to be going as a nation, many people are absolutely shocked to discover that the United States really does not have any defense capability against the Soviets large offensive forces. They really believe that we already have defenses against the Soviets' missiles and planes. I would imagine, if you think for a moment, without knowing the precise details, common sense would suggest that we ought to have such defenses. Unfortunately, we have instead relied upon the threat of offensive weapons to provide for deterrence. We have been very fortunate that that has worked for a number of years. But we all lament the fact that we have had a hair-trigger type of situation, with the instability of perhaps going to a first strike or what we keep hearing on this floor, a use-it-or-lose-it type of strategy. What we are looking for in the strategic defense initiative are defenses that could begin to provide additional deterrence instead of relying entirely on offense forces for this task.

Now, let us face it. We are never going to be able to compete with the Soviet Union in offensive capability, whether it is conventional or strategic. They are going to build more tanks, more mortars, more planes. They are going to have more missiles. They are going to have more of everything. In offensive capability, we have certain constraints, whether it is political or resource allocation, and we are not going to be able to match them on an offensive basis, no matter how far we try to build up. Where we do have a distinct advantage is defensive capability because effective defensive capabilities depend on high technology.

What we can do in that capacity is superior to the Soviets because of our inherent productivity, our advantages in technological capability, our innovation, our free enterprise system, our entrepreneurship. You talk about new small businesses starting up, they are going into this business. Kids—I have three small children—are learning about computers in the school system, growing up in this area. Our desire and willingness to innovate and to devise new technologies gives us a tremendous advantage over the Soviets. So when we try to provide for the survival of this country, why not do what we are best suited to do? We are suited to come forth with new technology, we are best suited to look to the future. We have had deterrence based on offensive forces. This deterrence has worked but that does not mean that it is necessarily going to work for the next 20 years and, by golly, we better start thinking about moving forward. There is no doubt about it, SDI does move forward and does provide a defensive capability. It is an important step and I hope—and I anticipate—that the President would not see this as a bargaining chip. This is not a bargaining chip. This is something that is in the best interest of this country.

This is not something where you sit down and say, "Well, we are going to give it up." It is something that gives us great hope for stability and deterrence in the future.

Mr. President, as we look at the strategic defense initiative, I think we would like to get beyond the research and testing and development and eventually we want to deploy it. We are not just researching never to deploy. We want to deploy. A lot of people say, "Well, when will you deploy?" After the 1990's, it is said, in broad terms, but I would think particularly as we go to Geneva and we talk with our allies, we ought to consider that the best and earliest deployment of any kind of missile defenses might not necessarily take place in this country first. As a matter of fact, I think perhaps the first deployment would take place in Europe because the Europeans are really threatened right now against intermediate ballistic missiles of the Soviet Union, the SS-21's, the SS 22's, the SS-23's, the ones that have conventional and chemical capability, not to mention the strategic capabilities of the Soviets' SS-20's. I am looking at the conventional and chemical capabilities. We have no defensive capability in Europe against these missiles now. The Soviet Union has a defensive capability against ballistic missiles, I might add. They already have an ABM system deployed and have deployed antitactical ballistic missiles as well. Of course, sometimes we think, well, perhaps we should not do what the Soviets have already, in fact, done. But I think as we look at what missile defenses to deploy, deploying antitactical ballistic missiles in Europe probably would be the first logical step and it is something that does not have to be negotiated; we just need to go forward, certainly within the confines of anybody's interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

I think that there is, in fact, great promise as we move forward in this arena.

Mr. President, beyond the need to move ahead with SDI, the President has also rightly emphasized the desirability of first, negotiating deep offensive missile cuts, second, demanding Soviet compliance to existing arms control agreements, and third, securing regional stability.

The last of these points is critical. As the President noted, "staking our future on a precarious balance of

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/04/28 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001101480011-2